India's Socially Regulated Economy by Barbara Harriss-White (QEH)







Paper for the 7
th International Conference on Institutional Economics, University of 
Hertfordshire: INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Working Paper Number 133 
 
India’s Socially Regulated Economy 
 
 
(This paper is reworked from the Radha Kamal Mukherjee Memorial Lecture, Conference of 
the Indian Society of Labour Economics, Kolkata, December, 2003 which was published in 






By far the larger part of the contemporary Indian economy – judged by measures as 
disparate as GDP and livelihoods – is not directly regulated by the state. It is regulated 
through social institutions. Social institutions express forms of power not confined to the 
economy. Macro-economic policy is implemented through their filters. In this paper some 
propositions derived from a large primary literature concerning the roles of gender, 
religious plurality, caste, space, class and the state are introduced. Liberalisation is argued 
to increase the tension between forces dissolving social forms of regulation and those 
intensifying them. 
 
“Statics and dynamics are not engineering.” 
“ Institutions show a continuous, reciprocal and progressive adaptation.” 
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There is no better way of trying to pay homage to the significant contributions made to both 
economics and sociology by Prof. Radha Kamal Mukherjee, than by revisiting some of the 
important questions which preoccupied him  - along with many other practical economists - 
in the first half of the last century. Many of these questions are now quite unfairly consigned 
to the dustbin of history where they settle beside the names of a multitude of scholars who 
asked them.
1 Chief among his questions are those about theorising historical specificity, 
about making higher-order statements about the dynamics of the economy as an instituted 
phenomenon, about theorising the matrix of non-market institutions without which the 
market economy cannot function, and about discovering the significance to the economy of 
their variety, their diversity and their dynamics. Even by the 1920s, Prof Mukherjee had 
deplored the way in which economics had ‘largely weaned itself from the humane tradition’ 
and emphasised a rigidly positivist analysis in which ‘individuals are considered apart from 
the institutional setting’ (Mukherjee, 1940a, pp.4-5).
2 He saw that economic value is not only 
the product of  prices and costs but also of the institutions which guide each individual’s 
‘choices’ or actions and which are both constitutive and symbolic of the social relations and 
meanings from which all action emerges. For Mukherjee, this matrix is not a set of ‘fixed 
constraints’. On the contrary, the actions of people socialised through these mutually 
interdependent institutions continually adapt them  - so that they are always in flux and rarely 
consciously ‘engineered’ (ibid., p.7, 9, 12).
3 Realising that institutional diversity is 
foundational, he argued that it was necessary for economics to understand and seek to explain 
relationships that were context specific (ibid., p.9; Mukherjee, 1940b, p.28).
4  
 
It follows that ways need to be discovered of determining the key institutions through which 
the economy is shaped by human agency and of tracing their co-evolution. There is still no 
consensus over their identification or over the motors of institutional change. Mukherjee 
named ‘industrial technique’, the ‘organisation of employment’ and ‘controls on capital 
mobility’ (ibid., p.4). 
5 In another exercise, he listed the state; social groups, their relations 
and institutions; private property; competition and custom; law, convention and public 
opinion; social values and ideologies (ibid., pp19-20). 
6 Feminist economists have been 
assiduous in privileging gender.
7 Scholars such as  Hodgson (2001) and Chang (2003, pp.53-
56), revisiting the question of institutions, consider permutations and combinations of money, 
                                                            
1 Only recently has Geoffrey Hodgson  brought them and their concerns back to life in his book ‘How 
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3Mukherjee, op. cit. p 7, p 9, p12. 
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banking and financial institutions, legitimate commodities, property rights, institutions of 
trade regulation, corporations, unions and exchange
8.  Already, two generations earlier, 
Mukherjee (1940b, pp.28-30) had also perceived that in order to uncover the interactions 
between economic organisation, and the modes of social conduct and ethical beliefs that 
underpinned an economy, this complex texture had to be understood not in the abstract but in 
the concrete. This then required a spatial context: the region is the field of play of the 
‘concrete wholes’ comprised by an ensemble of institutions. 
9 The region also shapes the 
character of an economy.  
 
While, for Mukherjee the region was construed through a combination of culture and natural 
ecology, in this essay the region is that of India – a political nation and a multicultural society 
cradled in a great variety of agro-ecological regions.  And the question to be investigated 
concerns the mutual development of a set of institutions reflecting forms of power which 
develop outside as well as inside the economy. These are institutions not generally 
considered by the institutional economists: gender, caste, religions and space as well as class 
and the state. How do they sustain the process of capitalist accumulation? 
 
II. The informal economy 
Some eighty-eight per cent of India’s population lives and works in settlements with fewer 
than 200,000 people.
10 This still rural and small town economy is dominated by agricultural- 
and food-related goods and services. In 1997, an average of a little over 10 per cent of total 
consumption expenditure in this part of the economy was estimated to be devoted to the 
output of the corporate sector.
3The other 90 per cent was spent on the output of the informal 
economy, in which most of the 88 per cent worked. The informal economy either lies outside 
the scope of state regulation, or is officially subject to state regulation but nevertheless does 
not operate according to the rules and laws through which the formal intention of regulation 
is inscribed. In the first sense it is familiar as ‘unregistered’ and ‘unorganised’, and defined as 
consisting of firms with electricity but under 10 workers or without electricity and over 20 
workers (conditions which are very rare outside agriculture). With respect to the second 
definition, although this is clear enough on paper, in practice most firms with labour forces in 
excess of the threshold for registration have a substantial casual labour force that is 
undeclared under the Factories Act and hence not state-regulated. Indeed, one study of 
corporate capital put the proportion of unorganised labour in various corporations at between 
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9 Mukherjee, 1940b, p28-30. 
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3      From raw data in Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, 1997. The proportion varies from 6 % in 
Assam to 17% in Punjab and Rajasthan.Corporate and public sector enterprise is estimated  to produce about 
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40 per cent and 85 per cent.
4 Moreover, out of India' s labour force of over 390 million, only 7 
per cent are workers on regular wages and salaries  - and of this small proportion, only half 
are unionised. Between 1989 and the mid-1990s, the unregistered workforce appears to have 
increased, from 89 per cent to 93 per cent.  
 
The informal economy was recently estimated as comprising 60 per cent of net domestic 
product, 68 per cent of income, 60 per cent of savings, 31 per cent of agricultural exports and 
even 41 per cent of manufactured exports.
5 There is no evidence that the informal economy is 
shrinking and there is plenty of evidence that it is the shock absorber of the reform period.
6 
But shock absorption is but one of the many roles of this, the greater part of the Indian 
economy, and not the most important.  
 
The fathers of modern India’s development project, not least Nehru, and early development 
economists such as Myrdal were well aware of the forms of social organisation that regulated 
the economy - institutionalist theory had not yet been routed by what Radha Kamal 
Muhkerjee called the ‘cold demon’ of reason. 
1However, Myrdal considered them ‘a 
tremendous force for inertia’ (1968, p103). He, together with India’s leading sociologists, 
expected them to be banished by the rationalities of big business, the state and planned 
development.
77Some thirty years later in the 1990s, the era of  liberalisation once again 
provoked predictions that the rationalities of contract would replace custom and that acquired 
characteristics would replace ascribed ones as the basis for market transactions.
8 Just as the 
economy would be released from political influence, so also would archaic kinds of social 
institution, or ‘primordial identities’,  become increasingly irrelevant to its operation.  
 
The main arguments advanced in this essay are that the larger part of the modern Indian 
economy is regulated in significant ways by social institutions derived from ‘primordial 
identity’ and that, (although continually contested), they are resistant or immune to change by 
means of macro-economic policy. These regulative institutions structure the economy, while 
being fields of power which also operate outside it. In its indirect regulation of this informal 
economy, the Indian state is not proof against the influence of these structuring identities, as a 
result of which it does not work as one would expect a modern developmental state to work. 
The implication is that standard prescriptions for reform under structural adjustment and 
liberalisation fail to address Indian reality. They are certainly expressed using concepts which 
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6      See Ghose, 1999 
1 Muhkerjee, 1940 a , p4 
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ignore the socially instituted economy. Yet their implementation is filtered through these 
structures. They will produce, if not the opposite of what is expected, at least some 
complicated surprises, ones not necessarily beneficial to most Indians or even to growth. 
Liberalisation increases the contradiction between solvent forces and forces which are re-
working forms of social regulation and intensifying their economic content. 
 
For Muhkerjee, to be scientific in the study of any economy required a critical search into the 
meaning of its social structures, which have a bearing on the ‘phenomena and relations 
within an economic system’.
1  The study of India’s informal economy is made even more 
complex because it has to be pieced together from innumerable more or less localised pieces 
of evidence, obtained for the most part from field research. Generalisations are therefore 
provisional and made here with caution. All-India-wide generalisations, however, including 
every aspect of macro-economic policy, ought to have the same health warning. Anyone who 
doubts the wider significance of the claims made here about the social structures under 
review must be willing to provide counter-evidence at the same level of detail. In any case, 
whatever the answers, the need to ask questions about social regulation is not in doubt. 
 
 
III. Social regulation  
Here, we attempt to examine the ways in which the most significant social structures of 
accumulation - religions, caste, space, classes and the state - regulate India’s informal 
economy. We will start however with gender. There are two reasons for its priority. First 
gender regulates the basic building block of the Indian economy: the family firm. Second, 
gender matters to the development of the economy; it matters to development seen as the 




Gender relations persist in being a pervasively important structure of accumulation in India. 
The informal economy is for the most part made from family businesses [‘combat unit(s) 
designed for battle in the market’ (White, 1993)]. These are the prime sites for the control of 
workers (of whom the most commonly oppressed and exploited are casual female labour 
3). 
Family businesses are also structures of hierarchical authority between men - patriarchy in its 
oldest sense. Irrespective of living arrangements, men negotiate authority based on the 
division of tasks and skill among them, while also deferring to authority based upon age. 
Men divide tasks between them - accountancy, purchase, sales (and the negotiation and 
enforcement of contracts and credit relations) - and the supervision of labour. ‘It is usual for a 
man to recruit his partners, managers and technical experts from among his close kindred’ 
observed M.N. Srinivas of industrial entrepreneurs near Delhi nearly 40 years ago, and this 
has changed little, if at all.
10  
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Accumulation is, therefore, the result of an intensely male, concentrated and specialised set 
of relations of cooperative control for the production of managerial labour. These managers 
also own the capital, sometimes in substantial conglomerates based on kinship networks. As 
firms grow in size, the demand for male family labour increases; but as fertility declines, the 
number of male agnates decreases. Yet, instead of drawing women family members into 
these firms, local elite women tend to be deprived of productive work and live fairly secluded 
lives based on the home. Male affines seem to be preferred over the recruitment of 
professional managers. 
 
Marriage alliances are carefully controlled to create and protect the resource flows crucial to 
capital accumulation. There are “business families” as well as “ family businesses”.
11 
Laidlaw’s description of Jain practice is worth quoting because it is widely relevant. A 
family’s ‘credit’ in business “is its stock in the broadest sense, which includes social position, 
its reputation and the moral and religious as well as the business conduct of all its members... 
When a family contracts a good marriage, its credit increases.... The potential impact on 
business confidence of particular potential alliances are explicit factors for 
consideration...because business practice depends...so much on trust, moral conduct and 
financial standing... This means that a family’s credit lies not only in the hands of the men 
who are actually engaged in business, but in that of its women too. When sons succeed 
automatically to their father’s position in the family firm, the future of the business enterprise 
is, quite literally, in the women’s hands” (Laidlaw, op. cit., p355-6). The ritual conduct of 
their women then has implications for business -  private behaviour affects economic 
transactions. 
 
These patriarchal arrangements affect allocative efficiency. Competition between firms 
(which are superficially independent entities but actually based on kinship networks) is 
frequently suppressed. Collusive oligopolies can be enforced. A small but vivid illustration is 
the manufacture and marketing of sweets in a South Indian town. Five large separate shops 
exist which belong to a father and his four sons. Sweets are prepared to some extent 
separately, but working capital is shared, prices are fixed, wage rates are controlled, and entry 
to the sector is resisted. From the returns from sweets this joint family has invested in a large 
agricultural estate and also in a legal training for one of its scions. 
 
Other economic consequences follow from keeping strong family control over young male 
property owners. They have often been educated only to the level compatible with continuing 
to live at home or with close kin, i.e. within the social and cultural limitations of small towns. 
The impact on economic performance of the education ceiling has been contradictory. On the 
one hand, the edge of competitive innovation is thereby blunted and since most technical 
change is capital biased, the economy is more labour intensive than it otherwise might be. On 
the other hand, rates of accumulation are kept high by lack of competition and innovation. 
 
The reinforcement of patriarchal relations in the class controlling local capital also has 
                                                            




contradictory effects on the welfare of women. These have been theorised as positive for the 
female work force or for upwardly mobile subaltern social classes but negative in the heart of 
the local business class itself. Their most extreme impact is on life itself. Economic 
explanations focus on the consequences of what Ester Boserup called ‘productive 
deprivation’ 
1 together with the diffusion from its north Indian heartland of the dowry, not 
vested in the bride but taking the form of a transfer from bride givers to bride receivers. As 
the economic costs of women rise and their economic benefits fall, so does their relative 
status. Recent research in South India, where the relative status of women has been high, 
confirms what Satish Agnihotri found, India-wide, for the 1980s, namely that as household 
wealth rises the relative survival chances of women drop.12 Whereas the juvenile sex ratio 
for landless agricultural households in 1994 was 930, that for under-15 children in the local 
agro-commercial and business elite was 784.  13 This is extremely low.  The 2001 census 
reveals that whereas the aggregate sex ratio is improving, the child sex ratio is deteriorating 
to quite alarming proportions in certain states in north India.14 An economic explanation for 
this phenomenon would emphasise the implications of economic growth for the expansion of 
small scale property ownership, and then the implications of petty property for inheritance by 
men. 
 
In the end, however, the relatively low and deteriorating life chances for women in the 
families of local business elites has to be accounted for by a male supremacist culture. For 
although gender bias in life chances can be explained by low relative female status arising 
from lack of earned income, by the burdensome costs of dowry and by the demand for male 
family labour in firms,  business families are relatively wealthy and not bound by material 
constraints. In the business elite we studied in 1994, the ratio of estimated average dowry per 
daughter to estimated average business assets net of dowry per son was estimated at 1:12. 
Dowry is in no sense a burdensome pre-mortem inheritance. It can be concluded that the 
gender structure of wealth creation and property accumulation benefits men 
disproportionately. 
 
Religious plurality   
 
Although Indian religions have co-evolved over the centuries, practically no research has 
been done on the economic impacts of this co-evolution, whether on the impact of ideas and 
doctrines about right behaviour in the public sphere, and in relation to ‘others’, or on the 
impact of their respective forms of social organisation. Our argument here, therefore, consists 
of preliminary hypotheses. The roles of religions will always be specific. Religions can be 
found supplying collective identities which, in turn, provide indispensable conditions for 
capital accumulation. In India, religious affiliation can govern the creation and protection of 
rent, the acquisition of skills and contacts, the rationing of finance, the establishment and 
defence of collective reputation, the circulation of information, the norms that regulate the 
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inheritance and management of property, and those that prescribe the subordination of 
women. In addition, religious groups are often found regulating and distributing livelihoods, 
and providing insurance and last-resort “social security”. In these ways once more the 
distinction between the private and the public sphere is blurred and forms of non-economic 
and divine authority may still be found to govern economic behaviour. A single simplified 
example must stand for many. The economic significance of the Jain religion is far greater 
than the share of Jains in India’s population (0.4 per cent). With a religious philosophy 
involving non-violence and the renunciation of worldly passion and with a claim to be caste-
free and ritually egalitarian, Jains are commonly found to be wealthy local merchants, 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers and are actually divided by subsect and lineage. The Jain 
mercantile diaspora began under the Mughals and was consolidated under the British (under 
whose rule banias laid the foundations of Indian manufacturing industry and banking). In the 
informal economy, Jain business and kinship is tightly structured along the lines described 
above. Outside the set of co-religionists, money is lent but not borrowed (other than from 
commercial banks). 
 
In the few instances where transactions between economic parties belonging to different 
religions have been systematically studied [e.g. Banias by Fox (1969), Jains by Laidlaw 
(1995) and Ellis (1991), Marwaris by Timberg (1978), and Muslims by Mines (1972) and 
Wright (1981) and Kaikkoolar merchants by Mines (1984) 15], and depending on the relative 
size and power of the minorities locally, inter-religious transactions have been observed to be 
more exploitative than within-group ones.16  The co-existence of economic groups based on 
religion sustains and stabilises rates of return. 
 
This is not to argue that collective preconditions to competition cannot be found in 
organisations that straddle groups defined by religion  - as in the case of Chambers of 
Commerce - or be marked by groups within a given religion - as indeed they are with caste 
which is discussed next. The proliferation of sects and denominations has non-economic 
causes and, as we have seen with gender, other forces than a plurality of divine authorities 
also limit competition and protect rents. But actually existing religious plurality in 
contemporary India has meant that the deepening division of labour and the proliferation of 
new and technologically upgraded commodities and services are easily and commonly 
aligned with religious sub-castes and sects.1 Satish Saberwal (1996, p.39), following Marx, 
refers to it as India’s social ‘cellularity’ onto which are mapped many ‘communities of 
accumulation’. The consequences of such tesselation include the social patterning of 
residential areas, the spatial patterning of economic activity, the sometimes very profitable 
occupation by minorities of sectors of the economy formerly deemed to be defiling by Hindus 
(e.g. the tanning and recycling industries and the bidi (local cigarette) labour force all 
dominated by Muslims) or of crafts produced for former aristocratic patrons (e.g. in UP: 
brassware, glassware, cotton and silk embroidery and the making of perfume - all also 
dominated by Muslims). While there is evidence that the exclusive links between guilds 
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1For example, sound services have been pioneered by entrepreneurs from the barber caste (who are also 
musicians), drycleaning and power laundries by dhobis (washermen) , leather goods and travel agencies by 




based on religion and occupation have long been contested and are dissolving, there is 
nevertheless a significant amount of continuity in the Indian economy. Its general implication 
is a social resistance to the mobility of capital and labour; but the outcomes of this resistance 
are not determinate, depending as they do on local historical circumstance. For Jains this may 
mean great indirect power over the local rural economy through webs of credit. For other 
religious groups, such as the Muslim traders of Pallavaram, 16 the scale of their 
accumulation may be limited by lack of access to finance or long-distance trade contacts. 
 
But religions also owe their roles in the economy in part to the secular aspirations of the state. 
First, in setting out under the Constitution to keep equi-distant from all religions, and by 
establishing a legal regulative framework for the economy (which has been implemented very 
patchily), the Indian state left the economy open to be an arena in which the religions 
compete in a great range of ways, from the provision of infrastructure inadequately provided 
by the state (such as educational facilities - open to one and all) to communal conflict fanned 
by economic rivalry.17 In so doing, they reinforce the conditions making religious 
organisation necessary in the economy. In this gentle to fierce competition, groups identified 
by religion become increasingly objectified sets of moral agents with locally contested 
rankings and power.  
 
Yet the Indian state has not been able to keep equidistant, and indeed has been penetrated by, 
religions  - by the routes of political patronage, by the consequences for minority politics of 
reservations, and by unequal treatment of the religions in the amendments of diverse bodies 
of religious personal and family law. As a result of this penetration and the tesselation of the 
economy, apparently neutral development policy will have differential impacts on people of 
different religions. Further, in not acknowledging the relation between the private sphere (to 
which, after Marx, it was assumed religion would be increasingly relegated) and the public 
sphere, which includes the economy, the impact of personal and family law on the economy 
was ignored. These bodies of divinely authorised law affect the building blocks of the 
economy through their differing impacts on property ownership and transfer on partition and 




Beteille (1996, p.450) writes of metropolitan India: ‘Caste is no longer an important agent of 
social placement or control’. But in a small town in south India (which we think does not 
differ much from most other regions in this respect) field research shows that Beteille’s 
conclusion does not hold. Here, the remnants of occupation-based castes are organised in 
several loose hierarchies based on work, diet, religion, language, land-based versus network 
forms of organisation and the politico-administrative categories of the state. Thus, all the 
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work connected with the public health infrastructure, without which the economy cannot 
function, is left for Scheduled Castes. Most Backward Castes and Scheduled Castes form 80 
per cent of the labour force. Backward Castes are gaining ground as owners of businesses, 
but Forward Castes dominate the concentration of capital. A third of all firms use family 
labour alone while a further 15 per cent will not employ labour not of their caste. So nearly 
half the firms are caste-homogeneous. 
 
The local economy is increasingly organised in corporatist forms based directly or indirectly 
on caste. ‘Caste is the strongest trades union’. Yet the regulative roles played by caste are 
complex. They vary with the position of individual castes in this loose hierarchy - and no 
doubt with the distribution of castes in different states.  
 
Caste structures the creation and disposal of waste without which markets cannot function. 
Rubbish marks the boundary between domestic and public space. Caste males do not 
generally handle this waste. Its disposal is part of a paradigm of service and subordination 
where caste and gender still reflect rank and stigma
.18 Scheduled Caste labourers do this 
sanitary work, but they have also entered trade in commodities with certain physical 
properties, such as foodstuffs with skins, or things which have to be transformed by cooking 
prior to consumption, or which need recycling, or which are traded in physically dirty 
surroundings. Entry into such markets has been a matter of the seizure and legitimation of 
physical public space - fruit and vegetable sellers have encroached onto the platforms of 
some shops or set up stall or sack-space on the roadside. The local state, in the form of the 
Municipal Market, has allowed freer entry to Scheduled Caste traders than have existing 
marketplace businesses, which have reacted with hostility to this particular disturbance to the 
local market order.  
 
Although party politics, religion, philanthropy and redistributive obligations all play a part in 
the way the local economy is organised and regulated, by far the most significant structures 
are caste-cum-trade associations. Caste has been reworked as an economic institution, least 
flexible at the base where social disadvantage is most entrenched. While some caste/trade 
associations are intermittent and called into life only when the trade is threatened, many, 
especially those of business sectors in which (Most) Backward Castes operate, are playing 
increasingly important roles in economic regulation and the provision of semi public goods 
and services which are essential preconditions to economic transactions. These include the 
rationing of entry to a trade, the definition of proper contracts, the settlement of disputes, 
collective insurance, collective representation to the state, the organisation of the spatial 
territory of the marketplace, the monitoring of rent-seeking and the way rents are shared with 
state officials and politicians, the control of labour disputes, the fixing of the wage and other 
terms and conditions of work, the control of prices in derived markets (e.g. for transport, 
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The organizations of the local business elite differ from lower caste-cum-trade associations 
by being more mixed-caste, better networked and more ambitiously federated. Reinforcing 
patriarchy and the rhetoric of ' town unity' , caste ideology works to support the economic 
interests of the local business class in exactly the manner Gramsci thought to be the essence 
of civil society
.20 Ideology, not usually considered a social structure of accumulation is in fact 
a significant shaper of it. It supplies the institutional structures on the back of which 
corporate organisations have evolved. It also helps to create the overlap between economy 
and society that is necessary to any corporatist project. The Indian economy has a distinctive 
propensity for this form of regulation, by means of which the antagonism between capital and 
labour is suppressed. The welfare and security of labour is at the bottom of the agenda of 
such institutions. Labour is often found to be admitted to these associations often only to be 
managed by owners in the interests of the owners’ accumulative strategies.
21 
 
Space - Clusters 
 
All these determinant structures of accumulation are mapped onto distinctive patterns of 
economic space. Capital is accumulated in towns and cities, yet India is weakly urbanised 
and its urbanisation displays a distinctive pattern of specialised clusters. Taking Tamil Nadu 
again (which is not exceptional in this respect), the Palar Valley specialises in leather goods, 
Cheyyar in reed mats, Arni and Kanchipuram in silk, Tiruchengode in drilling equipment and 
lorry bodies, Tirupur in hosiery, Salem, Coimbatore and Bhavani in textiles, Tiruchirapalli in 
gems, Sivakasi in matches, Palladam in chewing tobacco and so on - this list is very far from 
complete. Clustered development is thought to be a distinctive form of modern capitalism, 
one capable of generating two kinds of mutually beneficial collective efficiency. Passive 
collective efficiency is got from spatial proximity. This provokes the circulation of 
information, the consolidation of networks of contacts, subcontracting and process 
specialisation and access to services and infrastructure. Active collective efficiency is got 
from trade associations through which R and D, training and even export contacts may be 
engineered. But only a small minority of India’s clusters are of this sort. Most clusters are 
low-tech, with highly exploitive labour arrangements; some are the disguised and outsourced 
production units of one or two big companies hellbent on escaping the pincer of unions and 
Factories Acts. Further, while the voluminous literature explores the high- and low-level 
trajectories of specialised clusters, another kind of clustered development, which is neglected, 
is to be found (with both high and low subsectors) in almost every urban settlement - gold 
ornament crafting along with pawnbroking is one such example and foodgrains processing 
another.  
 
The character of clustered development varies, it can be hypothesised, not only according to 
local structures of property ownership and agrarian accumulation, but also according to the 
varying roles played in each cluster by castes (particularly but not exclusively mercantile 
castes) and by the state. The spatial distributions of these three social structures of 
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accumulation (class, caste and space) most strongly influence the kinds of commodities 
produced in a given area. They keep accumulation highly localised, shape the way labour is 
controlled, limit competition and permit - and legitimate the persistence of - environmental 
hazards such as the contamination of underground water and the ubiquity of solid waste. 
 
In most regions the local agrarian structure stratifies rural society sufficiently to let a range of 
technologies of transformation co-exist in a stable manner, each with different labour and 
factor requirements, creating a finely-differentiated range of products for markets which are 
socially and geographically segmented.22   The agrarian structure also shapes the terms of 
resource transfers between the major sectors of the economy, the supply of surplus labour 
(mainly but not exclusively from agriculture), and the terms on which labour works - and 
may even accumulate - in the non-farm economy. Clusters are shaped by path dependency 
originating from local land tenure, land use and cropping patterns, but are perpetuated by 
other factors (such as the lock-in of processing technologies and the development of non 
local trade) when land use and cropping patterns change. 
 
Though commerce is increasingly cosmopolitan, investments do not follow a simple logic of 
profitability because caste is often still the preferred basis for business partnerships, repeated 
contacts and credit. Private capital is un-fungible and ‘capital contra-flows’ may be observed 
in which urban capital-exporting castes investing in villages (e.g. in weaving) are unable to 
invest in the sectors open to migrant agricultural caste capital investing in town (e.g. in grain 
processing). Mercantile castes have a political and economic field based on networks 
independent of the agrarian castes. Nevertheless these networks are divided into the small 
localities that are distinctively marked by specialisation.23 (The one major exception to this 
rule is the 19th century marwari diaspora to regions weak in merchant castes where they still 
control the processing of - and trade in – most basic commodities, including gold.) In cases 
where a cluster has involved many castes, it has been found that the cooperation needed for 
collective efficiency is harder to organise and the transition from a low level equilibrium 
cluster to an Emilia Romagna type of industrial district is less likely.24 
 
If there is a solvent for this spatially and socially clustered economy, it is more likely to be 
the state rather than the market. The state may operate not only via its interventionist control 
over strategic sectors which provide raw and intermediate materials but also via the provision 
of infrastructure and subsidies. There are two ways, however, in which the state tends to act 
to reinforce clustering rather than to erode it. The chequered histories of small industrial 
estates shows that the state tends to complement capital in existing central places rather than 
substituting for it on new sites, and there is a marked ' distance decay'  in the quality and 
quantity of state infrastructural provision. Second, the state tolerates non- trivial 
environmental externalities by its negligent enforcement, or complicitous non-enforcement, 
of environmental standards. Exceptions to this (such as the degree of success of state-
enforced, state-subsidised collective treatment plants for tanning effluent in the Palar valley 
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Most of the Indian workforce has no formal written contracts with their employers. Their 
livelihoods come from (casual) wage labour (30 per cent of the workforce) and from self 
employment, dispersed and fragmented petty production and trade (56 per cent of all 
livelihoods).
26  Right after Independence, the tiny trade-union sector was systematically 
demobilised and made to depend on the State for mediation with employers.
1 Now only about 
3 per cent of the workforce is unionized and even this degree of labour organization has long 
been under attack from corporate capital (so it can hardly be the sole reason for the mediocre 
developmental performance of the corporate sector27). The other 97 per cent of workers are 
scarcely regulated by the state; they lack rights to work, enforceable rights at work and rights 
to social security. Migration notwithstanding, labour “markets” tend to be small-scale and 
fragmented. The Indian labour force is regulated not only through the compulsions of 
assetlessness, of clientelage, of beck-and-call contracts and (still) debt-mediated labour 
attachment, but also through the social structures of gender, religion, caste and the local 
corporatist occupation-based organisations. 
 
Apart from the domestic sphere, women’s work is heavily concentrated in rural sites and in 
agricultural work, on casual contracts and at wages bordering on starvation – on the average 
only 70 per cent of the wages paid to men.28 In non-farm work, women are likely to be 
concentrated in the lowest grades and stages, on piece rates rather than daily wages and with 
earnings even lower than those of men than in agriculture proper. Caste still shapes 
ideologies of work; it makes for compartmentalised labour markets ‘with non-competing 
groups whose options are severely constrained’ (Harriss, 1989). Few Brahmins will 
undertake heavy manual work, while to be Scheduled Caste (29 per cent of the population) 
makes a person twice as likely as otherwise to be a casual labourer, in agriculture and poor.29 
Technologies reinforce the contempt meted out to dalits through demeaning and physically 
damaging work: enormous weights are still carried by headloading rather than by 
wheelbarrow or conveyor belt; brooms and brushes require women to work stooping rather 
than standing. Caste also screens-out dalit recruits for entry into jobs in the rural non-farm 
economy. Workers themselves sometimes enforce the stratification of occupations so as to 
maintain their hold over enclaves of the labour market. In cases when owners and employees 
belong to the same caste (e.g. in the diamond cutting industry in Surat (Gujurat) or the 
hosiery industry in Tiruppur (Tamil Nadu)) labourers often emphasise their solidarity with 
employers, thereby ensuring the exclusion of other caste groups. Caste also provides an idiom 
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in which many sections of the labouring poor organise themselves politically, though not 
always in the context of work or labour relations in production. Social movements and the 
political mobilisation of dalits have gained momentum in their search for respect and social 
status. Caste based social movements have developed in synergy with the workplace based 
politics of lower castes.  In rural Bihar and elsewhere, the struggles of Scheduled Caste 
landless labour, at time in alliance with radical left wing political organisations, have led to 
violent confrontations, caste battles reflecting class conflict.30 
 
Labour is also controlled through the supply of infrastructure, in public spaces and in 
domestic life as well as at work.31 Not only is life outside work socially regulated but also 
the state actively regulates the reproduction of labour, through their lack of housing, water, 
education, their lack of social security, and their lack of space for living and leisure - perhaps 
more comprehensively that it regulates their work.  Caste based political organisation is often 
focussed on needs associated with this consumption and reproductive activity, work which is 
usually considered outside the sphere of market relations. 
 
Capital – the 'intermediate classes' 
 
Outside India’s metropolitan cities, the greater part of the economy is still dominated by a 
loose, awkward coalition of what Michal Kalecki called ‘intermediate classes’ and what 
Aijaz Ahmad calls ‘non-polar classes’ 32: a loose coalition of rich peasants (agricultural 
producers employing labour), working commercial capitalists (family businesses), and the 
collusive fraction of the bureaucracy that implements state regulations – some of which 
protect local business and some of which they resist and sabotage (see Chibber, 2003, b). The 
income of the rich peasants and family businesses can ' neither be classified as a reward for 
labour nor as a payment for risk-taking (i.e. profit) but is an amalgam of the two. The self-
employed lie midway between the large-scale, professionally managed capitalist enterprises 
of the private sector, and the working classes’ (Jha, 1980, p95).  The intermediate classes do 
not correspond to the Marxian definition of class, being essentially defined by occupying a 
‘contradictory class location’, in between workers and capitalists proper.
32  They have the 
strength of numbers. In 1980 P.S. Jha’s estimate came to 30 million with 8-10 dependants 
apiece – i.e. a total of some 250 million or about one third of the entire population. In relation 
to big business they appear small and dispersed, but in relation to labour they present a 
mighty front; they are the ‘masters of the countryside’.33  
 
These classes have conflicts of interest with labour as well as with corporate capital. They are 
in tension with labour over their control of the supply and prices of essential wage goods in 
which workers have a vital interest.  However, although, they may align themselves 
politically with corporate capital, they do not do this consistently because they reap direct 
opportunistic returns from the control of scarcity and from rents, whereas corporate returns 
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are mediated by managers and by shareholder interests. Intermediate classes are able to 
control scarcities by mark-up price formation, through oligopolistic collusion in markets and 
through structures of regulation shaped through partial state intervention which remain little 
touched by liberalisation.  In sectors where they compete head on with big business, 
intermediate firms may undercut big business by using family labour, by depriving wage 
labour of costly rights and by operating smaller-scale technology with lower fixed costs at 
higher capacity utilisation. And big business, despite its notorious delinquence, is still easier 
to tax than are the intermediate classes. 
 
Evidence from long term field research on agricultural merchants in West Bengal and Tamil 
Nadu together with that from a long term study of the economy of a town in Tamil Nadu 
reveals that while markets look crowded, much initiative is used to take the edge off 
competition, by means of which market shares are defended.34 Exclusive, repeated network 
transactions are a common ploy. Oligopolies co-exist with petty traders. The latter often 
depend on the former for information, contacts, and access to transport and credit. The 
vertical integration of a joint firm may be disguised by being divided up into apparently 
independent components. Wherever their activities have been examined in detail, agro-
processing and trading firms have been found to tend towards uniqueness, complexity and 
diversity in the business activities they comprise and combine. 
2 Not only does this endow the 
entire system with plasticity in the face of shocks, at the level of the individual firm, it also is 
a form of ‘branding’ and an invitation to loyalty. 
 
The mode of accumulation of the intermediate classes depends centrally on politics, though 
local capital does not have to enter party politics directly to ensure its power. Intermediate 
classes connive with local officials to secure the protection both of the rents they create in 
markets and of the state' s resources and rents that they capture. They seek state subsidies but, 
more importantly, they secure concessions by influencing policy in its implementation rather 
than its formulation. Nowhere are the concessions and collusion more important than in the 
evasion of tax. Tax evasion is the biggest disguised subsidy such classes have received and it 
defrauds the state, with serious consequences for the state’s capacity and legitimacy. 
 
The intermediate classes have survived and are surviving an unprecedented threat from 
several quarters: from MNCs, from the dismantling of some of the structure of state 
regulation, and the abandonment of its developmental mandate (which began in the 1980s 
with the erosion of fiscal discipline and the havoc caused to public sector capital expenditure 
by interest payments, debt and exposure to foreign exchange markets, and continued after 
1991 under the reforms);35 and the rise of a new middle class with a stake, through insurance 
and share ownership, in the corporate economy. The means of their survival are threefold. 
First, the productive investment of resources hitherto tucked away in the black economy. 
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Second, the still hardly reformed state regulation of much of the “prominent heights” of the 
economy (food, electricity, kerosene, fertiliser, liquor), some involving large subsidies to 
business, much involving bribery, which protects market-based rents and tax evasion. Third, 
the intermediate classes have been regenerated by a new, dispersed wave of accumulation on 
the part of the lower agrarian castes. The process involves disorderly relations not only with 
suppliers of marketed surplus but also with consumers, labour and the state. A sharp struggle 
over the surplus is under way, since, at 10.24 over the decade of the 1990s, the rate of 
agricultural growth has been mediocre and less than that of population.35 
 
IV. State regulation and the informal economy: a contradiction in terms?  
 
How does the state fit into this socially regulated economy? Although the Indian state is a 
significant actor in the informal economy, much of the latter lies beyond the state' s direct 
control, either because its units (small firms) are under the size threshold for regulation, or 
because the state neglects to regulate it - or is actively prevented from regulating it.  
 
Just as the informalised markets in which the intermediate classes operate create their own 
institutions to regulate and protect them, so the state by its interventions tolerates the 
development of many informal, socially-regulated markets. For instance, the public 
distribution system of food grains, extremely resistant to de-regulation, has long created price 
margins which draw in unlicensed and non-state-regulated processing and trade. Leakages 
from its stores and lorries still supply parallel markets for stolen grain. There are even 
standard prices for the exercise of influence, and markets in bureaucratic postings
.36 
 
At the same time as the state shapes socially regulated informal markets, it is shaped 
reflexively by non-state social structures of accumulation. It is the ambivalent agent of gender 
empowerment - a far more progressive employer in this respect than private enterprise. It is a 
formal initiator of development projects to empower women and an implementer of reforms 
to expand female representation and political participation. At the same time, by making it 
very difficult for women to qualify for licences or development credit, the state effectively 
reinforces male property rights. It does little to counter a prevailing anti-female bias in 
education and has not proved able or willing to resist the alarming deterioration in the 
relative status of girls.  
 
As we saw, it is also a distinctly ambivalent agent of secularisation in the economy. Acts of 
Hindu religious observance have long been incorporated into state office routines and state 
development expenditure is still being channelled through NGOs and trusts which are 
‘fronts’ for religious organisations. Through the policy of job reservations the state is at the 
frontline of social transformation as the important yet flawed champion of the social and 
economic emancipation of oppressed castes and tribes. Yet the international lending 
institutions see the state only as a technique of governance. They have called for it to 
downsize employment. As a result competition between castes has been reinforced, and an 
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informal system of job reservations has been developed through patronage practised by all 
castes. At the local level it is deeply permeated by private status. Its effective capacity 
depends on the social identities of the officials who happen to be in post - landed, male, 
upper-caste officials are better tax gatherers for instance - as well as by private interest 
(officials use their powers of discretion both to extract rents for themselves and to protect the 
rents of others). A ‘shadow state’ is created - a penumbra of people living from 
intermediation and corruption, with a strong interest in its perpetuation. The state seems to 
have become less and less able to regulate, redistribute or subsidise accumulation, the further 
it is from capital cities. Its monopoly of coercion, never complete, is being challenged by the 
proliferation of new mafia forces and private protection services. 
 
V. Real unorthodox structural adjustment 
 
For the international development agencies, structural adjustment and liberalisation consist of 
rafts of policies to remove distortions caused by protection and by domestic subsidies, in 
effect to adjust the domestic price structure to that of the world market, to let the structure of 
production reorganise itself and to extract the economy from politics. The state is no longer 
itself to be a structure of accumulation. It is true that the results of planned development 
differ from those produced by market forces, as the politically-determined locations of steel 
plants and heavy industry in India clearly show. Liberalisation ought therefore to generate 
spatial dislocations as it replaces non-market allocations by those of markets. Indeed this is 
predicted, unintentionally, by the advocates of liberalisation, who maintain that liberalisation 
is capable of reversing regional disparities, which have been in part the unintended 
consequence of the Indian Finance and Planning Commission’s bureaucratic controls over 
production, investment and trade. If markets respond to relative factor scarcities with greater 
allocative efficiency, if regions with lower capital-labour ratios have a higher marginal 
productivity of capital and, therefore, offer higher rates of return to capital, then regional 
disparities ought to be reversed by deregulation and replaced by regional convergence. But, 
what appears to be happening is the opposite: an accentuation not only of regional disparities 
but also of disparities within regions.
37  In general accumulation is increasingly specialised 
and spatially clustered and is driving intensified regional as well as social and labour market 
differentiation. Whereas Kanbur and Jhabvala argue (2004) that this is due to technology, we 
contend that this is also due to the social regulation of the economy. 
 
The adjustment of structures of prices and production is also accompanied by adjustments in 
social structures and in ideas and practices of accountability. If Indian capitalism is a social 
solvent38, it works sluggishly (to say the least) at the local level that has been our focus. In 
fact, if anything the reverse seems true: because capital accumulation relies on social 
structures of accumulation (which liberalisation does not address at all), the effect of 
liberalisation is not to abolish or transform those in which markets are embedded but to 
encourage them to re-work themselves as economic institutions and to persist. In the era of 
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liberalisation and globalisation, the structural adjustment that is taking place is not only the 
replacement of state-planned development, and ‘custom’, by market and contract. It is also 
the intensification of the relations between markets and the ‘non-market’ institutions without 
which markets cannot operate. Gender relations are the most resistant to change, and operate 
to advantage men quite disproportionately to women in the class which accumulates; there is 
no reason to see liberalisation as capable of transforming them. Caste and religion are much 
more flexible. They are emerging as structures that may generate exclusive, networked forms 
of accumulation and corporatist forms of economic regulation and that tend to operate to 
control labour to the advantage of capital. In practice, moreover, far from dissolving religious 
bonds liberalisation has been associated with an upsurge in religiosity. The real fluidity lies 
not in the solvent force but in the speed with which such collective identities are intensified. 
Though never theorised in this way, Hindutva itself might be explored as an attempt to carve 
and consolidate a moral space for Hindu accumulation at the expense of accumulation by 
adherents of other religions.  
 
Instead of a drastic reduction in the premium for political power predicted by the theory of 
liberalisation we see a new phase of mass political assertion for this power. Meanwhile the 
state structures aimed at promoting the livelihoods for and upward mobility of lower castes 
are completely at loggerheads with the objectives of liberalisation; but, even if they are 
constrained, their abolition is not an option. The state cannot avoid its role for low and 
sceduled caste aspiration. 
 
And as we noted earlier, in the economy in which 88 per cent of Indians live, the state is so 
riddled with fraud and corruption that an enormous ' shadow'  has grown up around it which 
depends on it and feeds off it. Long ago Myrdal called the Indian state a ‘soft’ state. If 
anything it has become softer - Weber’s ‘steel cage’ has rusted - while the social structures 
around it have hardened. It looks less and less like the instrument ensuring market rationality 
that the advocates of liberalisation envisage. 
 
Reforms - however liberalising in intent - that depend on the formal legal infrastructure thus 
face three contradictions. First, while development requires the rule of law, in India 
regulative law is often unimportant - since much of the economy is not regulated by law and 
since locally influential and respectable people frequently appear to be convinced that they 
are entitled to be above the law
.39 Law is at best compromised by a mass of unintended and 
unforeseen consequences; at worst it is a mere base for extortion, formally counterproductive 
but informally very productive - for legislators, bureaucrats and powerful ‘clients’. Second, 
any attempt to ‘downsize’ or even shed inappropriate laws means a capitulation to those 
already breaking them, which delegitimises the state. Third, attempts to shed laws that are 
inappropriate because impossible to implement results in looser law which is easily abused.
40 
And what is true for the law is likely to be true more widely for the institutions that 
implement the law. 
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In this paper, it has been argued that another kind of unorthodox structural adjustment, and 
one long preceding that of the World Bank and the IMF, is that caused by under-funding the 
state. The leaching of taxable resources into the rapidly expanding black economy deprives 
the state of resources.
 Black wealth is laundered abroad, or stored in real estate, finance, 
(retail) inventory and a relatively small amount in the form of gold.  According to one careful 
estimate this leakage is some 20 times greater than leakages due to corruption.41 The state 
responds to this famine of resources by protecting salaries at the expense of equipment and 
investment,42 producing for example the phenomenon of a fire brigade with firemen but 
without water or diesel fuel, whose functioning is completely dependent on a local private 
economic patron. Freezes on staff recruitment play havoc with lines of reporting 
accountability, enforcement capacity and therefore on the time taken to achieve objectives 
and the quality of goods and services.43 Low quality provision encourages informal private 
or black alternatives. The loss of legitimacy resulting from this kind of structural adjustment 
is then self-reinforcing. 
 
Likewise, corruption is not reduced when the sites for the corrupt privatisation of public 
goods and services are removed by state compression or privatisation. Quite the opposite 
appears to have happened. The reasons are not hard to find. Partial changes in ownership may 
decentralise and multiply sites for corruption by complicating accountability and diluting 
enforcement capacity. Some business interests may use bribes to dilute enforcement, or to 
maintain privileged access to resources or to exemptions while other interests will bribe to 
enforce deregulation. Officials may seek bribes against promises of future economic rents, 
given that their tenure outlives that of their political masters.44 
 
Although liberalisation invites a change in the character of the control of the economy, not a 
release from it, still there is considerable continuity in the structure of regulation nurturing 
the intermediate classes. The largest subsidies - for fertilisers, food, agricultural electricity 
and to a lesser extent credit, have proved extremely hard to reduce.
 45 The intermediate 
classes remain potent players. The capacity to accumulate has now spread from castes and 
classes which have hitherto resisted paying tax to lower agrarian castes which have never 
before been required to pay them - at least not directly. A new wave of small capital is 
reinforcing and expanding the informal and black economy, intensifying the brutal 
casualisation of labour and transferring the risks of unstable livelihoods to the workforce. 
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VI. The Implications for development policy of the real unorthodox structural 
adjustments 
 
‘Policy’ is then best understood as the outcome of the way political resources have been 
deployed in the struggles for rents that take place at all stages - discursive, procedural and 
allocative - of the so-called ‘policy-making process’. Liberalisation does not destroy these 
rents but simply intensifies the struggle for them. 
 
To ask, as students of Indian development are so often invited to do, whether the economy is 
‘inefficient’, implies that some alternative set of social structures of accumulation is 
imaginable with which those that actually exist in India might be compared. Nothing in the 
relationships and trends we can currently observe seems to suggest that this is possible. 
India’s structures of social regulation are deeply entrenched.  
 
The relations between the formal state, the formal economy, the shadow state and the 
informal economy are the outcomes of political struggles. The state’s convection system of 
taxation and distribution is shorn of civic egalitarianism. Unless and until there is a strong 
public mandate for tax compliance and against corruption - both of which are essential first 
steps towards accountability, and have been invoked as ‘solutions’ for decades
46 -  the 
prospects for the intermediate classes still look good. Fraud and tax evasion are part and 
parcel of Indian capitalism; in order for both non-compliance with the state and the flouting 
of the constitutional entitlements of labour to be so widespread and persistent, people’s moral 
world - the units of accountability - must be immediate or restricted to levels well below the 
nation - or even the local state. Countering this socially-regulated, but fundamentally anti-
social economy calls for the emergence of a much more robust and active culture of 
collective accountability in which the legitimacy of the state would also need to be 
renegotiated.  
 
If points of leverage for change exist at all, they lie in institutional mechanisms which might 
make capital more accountable to the state, and the state to other parts of civil society. These 
are urgent questions of development policy which are prior to exercises of technical choice 
and prior to the listing and evaluation of “de-regulative” policy options and sequences that 
are the stock-in-trade of conventional development policy. The questions provoked by this 
critical review of India’s socially regulated economy are at a considerable remove from the 
narrowly electoral and formal concept of democracy deployed by international agencies for 
finance and aid. The abstract and unreal conceptions of economy and polity that currently 
prevail in mainstream  economics and in much of the other social sciences are at a 
considerable remove from the concept of the socially instituted economy envisioned by Prof 
Mukherjee. 
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